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n&D ALLOCAT ION: RELI ABILITY VS. CUSTOM ER COST 
R1chard r. Gretz, 1 3 r:-~d l cy Uni ve rs it y 
.l :illnett lll ghli ll , nr:-~ d lcy Uni ve rs it y 
IZo hen C. Sc(ll t, !3rad lcy Un1vcrs it y 
Tlt e paper considers a monopol p fi rm 11•irlt IH 'O p ossible R &D projects, one improving tlt e product 's reliability tmd the 
second redu cing rit e cus tom ers' costs associated ll'itlt product j{1ilure. Th e firm must ch oose on e project or th e oth er, and 
has a .fixed budget j(1 r /{ & /) expenditures. A condiriu 11 on param eters is derived 1vhich indicates which proj ect should be 
ch osen. !l!onte Carlo analrsis suggests that for th e firm 's decision -making th e most important parameter is a m easure of 
rit e amhient le••el of technology. From socie() ' 's point of vie 11•, rit e most important param eter in determining th e effect of 
rit e !UU) ch oice 011 societ1• is rit e si~ e of th e marker being served by th e firm. 
INTRO DUCT ION 
/\I though the success o r an y lin n, In dustry. o r co untry 
dcp<.: 11ds on J cc ls lon-lll ake rs ge ttin g 111any thin gs ri ght , the 
p1cse nt paper argues that tec hnology chOICes arc parti cular ly 
1111portant /\ nd , although good dec1s1ons need to be maue at 
a ll lc \·e ls, th e li1m 1s \\'he re tcchn olngv c rea tes a wc lfare-
cnh :J nc lllg plllduct. It hard ly needs to be sa id that business 
lcadc1 s ha\ e recog n1 zed the connec t 10 11s between lll ll OVation, 
R& D spcnd1ng, qualit y, ami nat 1onal we li'are: 
Nor lu ng con do m o r ej(; r r/11• US econOIII,I' n nd ro h elp 
<'nsure ,. [IIJ, ·ncu ·s glohu l COII/fl<' lii/\ '' ' 11 ('.\'S rlwn WI 
r'lllw ncr'djoc us 0 11 1111/U \'Ui ion ull!! r esearc h hy t!w 
flllhf t<' (IJI(/ /)/'/ 1'(1/ (' SL'CIOJ'S 
1:. J)unne Ac kerman , Cha mnan and Chic!' 
l''\ ee ut1 ve Oflice r 13 e i1 South C.\1 rporat1 0 11 
( I 1cbennann , :WOS, I ) 
US l erul ersh ttJ 111 fl·c /u {()/ogl' lws heen fill' c orner stone 
of . l men, ·u's slrWl',1', 1l'.l' ji l r t!rn 'tll,l!, ccon rmu c g rOll 'fli 
(II/,/ <' IIS/11'11 1_!; // ({{ / () Il if f .ll'C l/1 if_\' 
( ieo1gc Scalise. l'res1dcnt , Se m1 condu e tor l ndu ~ try 
/\ssoc 1:1tion ( I 1cbennann , 2005, I) 
l'he go: il ol thc p1·ese nt paper is to ex plo re the R&D 
dc cl..; l(ln n1 :1 king o f :1 monopo ly firm in the case that the firm 
has two compct1 ng R&D projccts under cons iderCJ ti on. 
llnc ll y, the lirst type o r R& D projCCt il nproves th e produc t's 
re ll ,lb llit y \\'hil c the second type o f R& D projec t im proves 
the prtlduct 111 the sense tha t it red uces th e customer cos t o f 
Lnllll e . It IS :1 SS LI 11led th nt the uec ision-make r in the linn 
must choose nne proJeCt or the o ther, and has a fi xed budget 
1\11 R& D e\pendllu res. T he lirst maj or result o r the paper is 
a eo nd1t1 on on parame t e r~ ( 12) th at indicates whi ch proj ect 
should be c ho~c n . The second maj or res ult suggests that o f 
these para mete rs, th e one which meas ures the nmbicnt level 
o r technology 1s most importa nt, as will be seen in T able 5. 
l'he tlmd major result is that the mos t import ant parameter 
111 uctenn 1ning the e ffe ct o f R& D cho ice on soc ie ty is the 
s1ze o f the market be in g served by the lirm. ee Tab le 6. 
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LITERATURE REV I EW 
T he standard survey of how the U.S. became the 
technolog ica l leader in the peri od fo llowing World Wa r II 
may be Nelson and Wright ( 1992). They argue th at one key 
source o lthi s leadership was " the mass ive pri va te and pu bli c 
in ves tm ent s in R& D and sc ienti fi c and techn ica l educati on 
that the Uni ted States made a fter World WJr II " ( 1992 , 
1933). Cr ;cenz i, Rodrigues-Pose and Storpcr (2007 ) argue 
that the U.S. has greater in nova ti ve capac it y than the E.U. 
because it ha s re lati ve ly more mobil e capita l, popu lati on Jnd 
knowledge . More generall y, Brez is, Krugnt an, and Tsiddo n 
( 1993 ) have an ea rl y paper :-~rguin g that " tec hnolog ical 
change tends to re in force the pos iti on o l' lcadi ng nati ons" 
( 199 ' 12 1 I), which is the s t :~ rtin g point or the present paper. 
/\ !though the ir paper has severa l ad vant a •cs co mpared to the 
present paper. technolog ica l im provement s in their model 
nrc esse nti a ll y i'rce and exogenous, whi ch o r course , obviates 
the maJ Or research ques ti 0n o f the present paper. Fu rman 
and ll nyes (2004) empir ica ll y in ves ti ga te how countri es tha t 
we re prev ious ly imitators in techno log ies c:1n hc:co n1c 
l e :-~ d c rs . They fi nd that " the deve lopment o f innovati on-
enhancing po li c ies and infrastructures arc necessa ry for 
achiev ing innovati ve l c :.~de rship , hut that these are 
ill suiTi cicnt unl ess co upl ed with ever-increas ing linancial 
and human capita l in ves tm ent s in innovati on" (2004 , 1329). 
No t eve ryone J grees with the th es is th :1 t tec hnolog ica l 
progress is either necessary or suf'fi c ic11t lor improv ing 
economic we lla rc. G lass ( 1998) argues, !'or examp le, that 
" technolog ica l lcaue rship docs no t necess::~ ri l y contribute to 
nati onal we lfare" ( 1998, 252), but it appears th :1 t thi s result 
is dr ive n by the :.~ss u1 np ti o n th at improving " technological 
leadership '' reduces the rate of innovati on- whi ch is by no 
means obvious. T here arc certa inl y those who argue that the 
means of achi ev ing techn olog ica l l e:~ ders hip it se lf are not 
simple or easil y understood, even ass umin g technolog ical 
l c:~d c rs hi p is a des irable goa l. Sec Nelson ( 1999) who has a 
(di scursive) stud y o f severa l industries whi ch he argues 
prov ides support fo r both sides r the " industr ia l po li cy" 
dcb :~ t c. Fina ll y, there :~rc those that argue the U.S. 's 
comparati ve ad vantage in hi gh tech produc ti on is 
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diminishing becau se o f changes in the g lo bal market fo r 
sc ience and eng ineering (Freeman, 2006). 
The co nsumer theory in thi s pape r fa ll s in the general 
line of the Sut to n and Shakcd ( 1987) lite ra ture in the sense 
that a di stributio na l foundati on fo r custo mer behavior is 
assumed. T his demand structu re is espec ia ll y co mmo n in the 
qua lity li terature . Sec I-l crgucra and Lut z (2003), C haudhuri 
(2000) , and 1-l crg uera , Kujal , J nd Pe traki s (2000 ). A unifo rm 
di stributio n o f reserva tion prices is fo m1a ll y s imil ar to the 
linear demand func ti on wit h no inco me o f Bra d and 
Shi va kumar ( 1997) , d ' Asprcmont and Jacqucmin ( 1988), 
and Greenlee (2005 ). Conceptua li z ing qualit y as a 
pro bability o f product fa ilure is no t new to the litera ture 
e ither, see, fo r exa mpl e, Dau ghe ty and Rc inga num ( 1995) 
and Matthews and Moo re ( 1987). Nor is the concept o f a 
customer cost new to the litera ture, Jun g (2004) , fo r 
exa mpl e, has a cost o f use fun c ti o n fo r the customer. Severa l 
papers have co mbined the two co ncepts as do ne in the 
present paper, sec Gretz , Hi ghfill , and Sco tt (2007) and 
(fo rthco ming), but as far as we arc awa re. thi s is the first 
anempt to choose between R&D projects as descri bed 
above. Q uadrati c cost o f qua lit y o r R& D fun c ti o ns, 
independent o f the quantity produ ced . arc co mmo n in the 
lite ra ture as well . (S ec Bra d and Shiva !--'l.tmar ( 1997), 
d'Asprc mo nt and Jacqucmin ( 19 8) , G reenl ee (2005), and 
Hcrguc ra and Lut z (2003).) 
THE RI~SEARC II AND DEVELOP!\ I ENT PRO.IECTS 
Near ly by de finiti o n resea rch and develo pment 
expenditures improve techno logy, fo r exa mpl e, the 
techno logy used in a producti o n p rocess and/o r the 
techno logy that is embodi ed in a p rod uc t itsc!C T he prcscm 
paper considers the latter s itua ti on- w he re R& D 
expenditures improve the " qu ;:llity" o f the firm 's produc t. 
Qua lit y has many possibl e mea nings; in the present pape r we 
focus o n two key no ti o ns. The firs t is '' re liabi lit y," the 
probabi lit y tha t the product mee ts th e c usto mer's 
ex pec tati ons wit hout having to rc tum o r re pa ir it. O ne minus 
thi s probabi lit y wi ll be de fin ed as ' 'produc t fa ilure ." 
Cons ider, fo r exa mpl e, minin g trucks, the large dump truc ks 
used in stnp or o pen-pi t mining o pe ra ti o ns to move rock and 
o re from the excava tio n s ite to the surface. Usua ll y the re arc 
a number o f trucks moving be tween the o re and the surface 
so that excava ti o n is a continuo us process. In thi s case the 
concept o f produc t fai lu re is stra ight fo rwa rd- a truck '' fa ils" 
when it canno t be used. Fo r o the r exa mp les (microwaves, 
co ffee makers, hair dryers- the lis t is a lmost end less) the 
produc t fail s when it docs no t meet the wa nts and needs o f 
the customer- w ho then rctums it fo r exchange o r repa ir. 
The probabilit y of prod uct fa ilure is clcno tccl by T . (The 
expos iti o n wi ll assume that any g iven customer wi ll 
experience at most one produc t fa ilure, a ltho ugh thi s 
assumpti o n is no t requ ired in the fo rma l ana lys is. ) 
The first type of R&D proj ect unde r cons ide ra ti o n by 
the dec is ion-maker improves th e produc t in the sense th at it 
reduces the probab ili ty of produ ct fa ilure. In the mining 
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truck exa mpl e, fo r instance, the R& D proj ect may be to 
impl ement a new we lding process which produces s tro nger 
welds and thus reduces the probabi lity tha t any g iven truck 
will fa il. 
The second key concept is the "custo mer cos t o f produc t 
fai lure" o r mo re s im pl y, the ' 'c us tomer cost of fa ilure." In 
genera l, produc t fa ilure imposes costs on custo mers. In the 
mining truck exa mpl e, suc h costs include no t o nl y th e: direct 
costs o f fi x in g the truck, but a lso a lithe costs as~oc i a tcd 
w ith shu ttin g down o r s lowin g the line, fo r exa mpl e , the 
wages fo r o the r equipment o pe ra to rs whose prod uc ti v it y 
de pends o n the smoo th o pera tio n o f the trucki ng li ne. In 
ex treme cases, the c us to mer cost o f fa ilure mi ght we ll be 
mo re th:~n the cost of th e mining truck itse lf. Fo r exa m ples 
like co nsumer goods, the cus to mer cos t o f fa ilure inc ludes 
the ex penses assoc ia ted w ith re turning the item, o r pe rhaps 
cos ts associa ted w ith no t be ing ab le to usc a mi crowa ve fo r a 
few clays . 
The seco nd type o f R&D proj ec t under cons ide rati o n by 
the decis io n-maker improves the product in the sense that it 
red uces the custome r cos t o f fa ilure. In thi s case the prod uc t 
is ne ithe r mo re no r less like ly to fa il , but if it does fai l the 
cos ts fo r the cus to mer a rc reduced . In the mintn g truc k 
examp le, fo r instance, th e R&D projec t may be to redes ign 
the eng ine so th a t access to ce rta in key parts is eas ie r thus 
red uc in g repair time and the assoc ia ted costs o f the li ne 
be ing down. Fo r consumer produ c ts the projec t may a lso be 
a redes ign, fo r exa mp le, so th at customers can make s imp le 
repairs (e.g., change a bu lb o r a filt e r) thcm~e l vcs usi ng he lp 
ava il ab le fro m a ca ll cente r. T he cus tomer cos t o f fai lu re is 
deno ted by K . 
It is ass umed th at custo mers (o r po tent ia l cus to mers) 
know th e pro bability th at a unit w ill [Ji l, o r cqutva le ntl y, the 
ex pected rc tu m ra te, bu t no t w het her the un it they purchase 
w ill fai l. T hu s thei r dec is io n to pu rchase de pends o n the 
" ex pected cos t o f prod uct fa ilure" w hich is the cus tomer cos t 
o f failure t im es th e probabi li ty th e produc t fail s, i.e., KT. 
T he resea rch and deve lo pment dec is io n for the manager 
is co nceptua lized as fo ll ows. T he firm (or profit cente r, e tc.) 
has a fi xed amo unt o f so me key resource so that bo th 
poss ibl e R&D proj ects ca nno t be clone. A profi t cen te r, fo r 
exa mpl e, has enough eng ineers to do one of the proposed 
R&D projec ts, but no t bo th . The engi neers themse lves a rc 
assumed to be n ex ibl e reso urces in the se nse that th ey can 
success full y co nc lude e ithe r project. (Sec Sco tt , 1-lighfill , 
and Sa lll c r ( 1988).) The dcc ts io n maker has a fi xed number 
of do ll ars to spend o n R&D , denoted RDE , "resea rc h and 
deve lo pment expe nditure.' ' Even th o ug h in the eco no mi c 
lite rature R&D expend iture is usua ll y endoge nous, o ur 
o bserva ti o n of firm behav io r leads us to be lieve firm s 
usua ll y have an exoge no us co nstra int for R&D ex pe nditure. 
W e specul a te that thi s may be a mea ns o f con tro lling r isk . If 
he o r she chooses the proj ec t to reduce the fail ure ra te, the 
p roj ect to reduce the custo mer cost o r fai lure w ill no t be 
do ne, and the cus to mer cos t o f fai lure remains at its 
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"a mbient leve l,'' denoted by K 0 > 0 , the " initi al customer 
cost o f failure." On the other hand, if the manager chooses 
th e project to reduce th e customer cost of fa ilure, then the 
prOJCCt reduc ing the fai lure rate will not be done, th e 
probab ility o f failure remaining at its ambient leve l, denoted 
by 0 < 7~ ~ I . 
The relati onship betwee n R&D expenditures on the 
probab ility o f product fai lure and the customer cos t of 
fa ilure ar-c assum ed to be respec ti ve ly 
ROE " ,, (1;- T)' " T " T, - J ROE (I ) 
ZT 
!?DE " ' K (K, - K )' oc K " K0 - J R~£ (2) 
- A 
where -::r > 0 and -::" > 0 . No ti ce th :J t in both cases the 
R&D e:\ pendit urc IS dcs rgned to reduce the probab il ity of 
f:1ilurc or the customer cos t of fa ilure. 
CUSTOM I~ R BEllA V I OR 
Suppose customers' rescrv:J ti on prices (deno ted v) fo r 
a perfec t prod uct (o r product of the hi ghes t poss ibl e qu alit y) 
~1re uniforml y distr ibu ted on th e int erval (0, V) , defining 
I ' as the highest reservati on price any potcntr a l custo mer 
wo uld hn ve fo r the product; nltcmati vc ly, V is th e int cn.:ert 
o f the incl1 rect dema nd fun ction fo r a pc rf'cct prod uct. 
Dc lin1ng P as the usua l co ncep t o f r ricc, i.e., th e r ri cc pa id 
by the customer wh ~.: n th e produc t is o r i g i Jt :.~ ll y purchased, 
th1.: " fu ll qu:.~ li t y price'' o f the product i.-; P + KT , th e pri ce 
plus the ex pec ted cost o f product fa ilure. Fo r a pcrl'cct good 
T = 0 and the price and full qu:.~ l it y price an.: th e sa me. 
IZcca ll that a /()ll' l' r qual1 ty produ ct is thus Jssoc iatcd with a 
h1 ghcr va lue of T nnd vice ve rsa. Simi larly, the customer 
bcndits from a low customer cost of fail ure, so sm:J II v:J iucs 
o f K arc better fo r the customer. 
Customers whose reserva ti on pri ce is g rea ter th an th e 
full qu al1ty pnce will bu y the product. Customers arc 
JnciJffercnt between buying th e prod uct and not buying it 
whe n 
t•= (P + KT) . (3) 
,\ ss umc the popula ti on d istributi on functio n is I I V and the 
quantity dema nded is the propo1 ion of potential customers 
who bu y it tim es the number o f potenti a l bu ye rs, deno ted 
N Quant1t y dema nded, Q , is thus 
£, I ( P+VKT ). O = N - dv =N I - /';1\T V 
I he ind1 rec t demand functi on fo r the innova tor is 
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T il E FIRM 'S OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM 
The firm (pro li t cent er, etc. ) is assumed to be a simple 
pro fit max imizer. It is assumed that the manager first picks 
which R&D proj ec t is clone, and then the li nn chooses the 
optimal quantit y. Produ cti on cos ts are constant per unit. The 
profit [unci ion is 
ll = (P - tnc( I + T))Q - RD£(1 - S) 
where me is the (co nstant) marg ina l cost o f producti on 
(note that the lirm ex pects to pa y thi s cost (I + T) times as 
the firm must fu ll y replace unit s tha t fai l) and S is a 
governm ent subs id y o f pri vate R&D expenditures. We 
includeS for generalit y, however we set S = 0 in the Monte 
C:.1 rlo simu lati ons be low since the focus o f thi s paper is on 
R& D project cho ice and no t gov..:mmcnt subsidies o f R&D. 
Subs tituting from (4) the profit fun ction is 
ll = (V - K T - ~ Q - rnc( l + T))Q - RDE(I - S). 
T he pro lit !'uncti on ca ptures a key difference between the 
two proposed R&D projec ts. Both projects benefit customers 
by redu cin g the ex pected cust mer cost o f product fail ure , 
/( T . This reduct1 on in the fu ll qua lit y cos t implies that 
more custo mers will purchase the product at a g ive n pri ce 
P , or equi va lent ly, the pri ce the firm wi ll receive for a 
g iven qu anti ty o f s:J ics will increase. 13ut the R&D project 
that reduces the probabi lity o f railurc he lps the firm in a 
second w:~y beca use it reduces the num ber of repl:.1 cement 
un its tha t have to be produ ced. 
To find the optimal behav ior, reca ll ing that the level o f 
I ~& D spend ing is exoge nous, it is s uffi c ient th at the firm 
max imi ze va r·i:J b lc profits 
v 
VP = (V - KT - N Q - mc( I+T))Q . (5) 
In the cnse that the manager chooses the R&D project 
th at improves qu alit y (reduces the ex pected return rate), 
us in g ( I) and (5) va ri ab le pro fit s, denoted VPT , arc with a 
s li ght rea rran ge ment 
VPT = (v -( 1\0 + lllc)( 7;1-J ~E J - mc - ~Q JQ· (6) 
Reca ll th at s ince the R&D fund s arc spent on T it f'o ll ows 
that K = K 0 , JS shown in (6). 
Similarl y, in the c:J sc that the manager chooses the R&D 
proj ect th :J t reduces the customer cost of fa ilu re, using (2) 
and (4) va ri ab le pro lits , deno ted VPK , arc 
VPK =(V -7;,( K, -r:~E +me )-mc-fQ )Q· (7) 
In thi s case the R&D fund s are spent on K so that T = T0 , 
as shown in (7). 
Eq uilibrium var iable va lues as well as conditions for an 
intcrn::tl so luti on fo r both cases are derived in the 
3
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Computationa l Appendi x. Co mparing (A2) to (A 6), the 
decis io n make r should choose the R& D project w hi ch 
improves re liabilit y if and o nl y if 
~
E 
(mc +K0 ) > T0 -- . 
ZK 
(8) 
To interpret (8) no ti ce from (A I) tha t the marg ina l inc rease 
in sa les from a do llar inc rease in R& D fundin g to red uce the 
pro babi lity o f fa ilure is 
dO N H I --~-=-(mc +K) ---. 




S imilarly from (AS) tha t the marg ina l inc rease in sa les fro m 
a do llar increase in R& D fundin g to reduce the cus tomer 
cost o f failure is 
__!!_fL - !!_ T [l _ l_ ( I 0) 
d RDE - 4V 0 ~ -;:: ,/RDE . 
Factoring out the terms (9) and ( I 0) have in co mmo n, 
the le ft-h and s ide o f (8) g ives the benefit o f R&D spending 
o n reducing the probab ilit y o f fa ilure while the ri ght -hand 
side o f (8) g ives the bene fit o f R& D spend ing o n reduc ing 
the custo mer cost o f fa ilure. N o ting the re latio nship betwee n 
quantity and pro fit in (A 2) and (A6), the dec is io n maker 
sho uld choose the proj ec t tha t has th e grea te r m arg ina l 
impact o n sa les and pro fits . 
The Computati o n Append ix co nta ins ana lytica l 
so lu tions to a ll imp o rt ant va ri abl es, as we ll as the conditi o ns 
J o urn ~tl o f Bus iness & Le:tdership : Rcsc3 rch, Practice and Tc3c hi ng 
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fo r an inte ri o r so luti o n. A na lyti ca l so luti o ns lend themse lves 
to qua lita ti ve ana lys is, but qu antit a tive res ults are o ften 
use ful as we ll. Co nditi o n (8) g ives a re la ti ve ly 
stra ightfo rwa rd dec is io n rul e fo r managers. Bu t quantita tive 
results ca n suggc:s t how much a firm ga ins by choosi ng th e 
ri ght proj ec t (a nd avo idi ng the mi s take o f c hoosin g the 
w ro ng o ne), no t to ment io n the ga in s to co nsumers :llld 
socie ty a t la rge. A Mo nte Carlo ana lys is is use ful in 
address in g these k inds o f q ues ti o ns. T he pa ramete r se ts and 
s imul ati o n cho ices fo r the M o nt e Ca rl o ana lys is a rc found in 
the N umeri ca l A ppend ix. 
MONT E CA RLO S IM ULATIONS 
T ab le I is des igned to co mpare th e o utco mes of the 
cases w hen no R& D is do ne, th e "No R&D" co lumn , whe n 
the o pt ima l R & D cho ice is made, the ··Pro fit Maximi z ing 
R& D" co lumn , and fin a ll y, w hen managers make the wro ng 
R&D ch ice, the "Non-Pro fit Max imi z ing R&D" co lumn . 
T he firs t two co lumns arc virtua ll y se l f-exp lanato ry, g iving 
the o utco mes fo r soc ie ty and th e finn in the cases described . 
T he o pti mal R&D s tra tegy as co mpared to no R&D a t all 
inc reases soc ia l surp lus on ave r:1ge by abo ut 134% 
( 1782 1. 117602.8 - I ) , co nsume r surplu s b y about 14 7% 
(6260.4 /2534.3 - 1) , and p ro tits by abo ut 128% 
( I I 560.6/5068.5 - I ) w hich suggests tha t qu ite a lo t is at 
stake in the R&D dec is io n fo r the firm , it s cus tomers, and 
soc iety. 
Ta ble I: Average E ndogenous Variable Values from Monte C arlo S imul a tion s wh en no R&D is 
Co nd ucted, w he n th e P rofit Max imizin g R&D Proj ec t is C ho se n , and when th e No n- Profit Maximizing 
R ... ~ 0 Projec t is C hose n 
No R<.~D Profit Max imi z in g R&D 2 
Mean Ave rage %, 
C hange * 
Soc ia l Surp lus ( SS) 7602.8 1782 1.1 237.89% 
Consumer Suq) lus ( CS) 253 4 .3 6260.4 335.56% 
Pro fit ( I1 ) 5068.5 II 560.6 189 05% 
Variab le Pro fit ( VP) 5068.5 12520.9 335.56% 
Purchase Pri ce ( P) 404. 1 4 34.0 12.89% 
Full Q ua lity Pri ce : P +KT 6 1 1.1 57 1.8 -6.66'% 
Q uantity ( 0) 43.2 72.2 77 .4 1% 
Improve Re lia bi lit y 4 5 0 1% 
Reduce C ustomer Cost 54 .99% 
Averages based o n 8740 o bserva tto ns. 
1 
Variab le va lues ca lcul ated w ith no R&D project chosen. 
2 Variable va lues ca lcubted w ith the pro fit max im iz ing R& D projec t chosen. 
3 Variab le va lues ca lcul ated with the no n-profit max imi z ing R&D projec t chosen. 
* A verage pe rcent change in variab le fro m the no R& D case. 
7 1 
Non- Profit Maximizin g 
R&:D3 
Mea n Ave ra ge 0/o 
C han oe•' 
11 605 .7 ~ ~~ .79% 
4 188 .6 6 1.4 6% 
741 7 .1 47. 12% 
83 77.3 144 .79% 
41 9.4 6. 17% 
59 1. ~ -3.30% 
57.5 39. 1 ~% 
5~ .99% 
45 .0 1% 
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The pe rccntJge ga in to co ns ume rs , rega rd less o f whi ch 
R& D p roJec t is c hosen, is g reat er tha n the ga in to the firm o n 
av..: ragc. Whil e purc hase pri ce in creases o n ave rage a fte r the 
qua lity improvement , full qua lit y price, P + KT , 
dec rc::~scs. Co ns um ers are be tte r o ff eve n tho ugh they are 
pay ing a hi g he r purc h ::~ sc price o n average. The fac to rs 
\\'hic h de termine the e ffect o f R&D o n pro fits w ill be 
ex p lo red fu rther be low, bu t no ti ce tha t the pro fit max imi z ing 
R& D projec t cho ice fo r the firm is to improve the re li ab ility 
o f tts produc t abo ut 45% o f the time and redu ce the c usto me r 
cos t o f p rod uc t fa tlurc abo ut 55% o f th e tim e. thi s is in spite 
o f the fa c t (as ex pl a ined in th e Num e ri ca l Appe ndi x) th a t the 
parame te r se ts were c hosen so tha t a priori ne it he r so lut io n 
ts f ~t vo red in the s imul ati o ns . 
T he th ird co lumn of T ab le I s hows the e ffec t o f the firm 
ma ktng the wro ng R& D c ho ice- i.e ., improving re lia bi lit y 
11 he n tt s ho uld he redu c ing custo mer cos t o f fa ilure o r v ice 
\ 'GrSil !'he fi rm' s oppo rtunit y cost o f c hoos ing the wro ng 
R&D projec tts la rge ; o n ave rage th e percentage inc re:t sc in 
profit is approxi ma te ly 2. 7 t im es grea te r (( I 1560.6/5068.5 -
I) (74 17 I '50611.5 - I )) whe n the linn c hooses the pro fit 
max tmt l. tn g l~&D proj ec t ra the r tha n th e wro ng R& D 
prOJCCl. T he oppo rtun it y cos t o f the wro ng R & D fo r soc ie ty 
1., the sa me o rd e r of magn itu de (( I 782 1. I /7 602 .8 -
! )/( ! 1605.7/760:28 - J)). 
N ext we inves tiga te how th e pa rame te rs a ffec t R& D 
c ho ice a nd w hi c h parame te rs arc mos t im porta nt. The 
tt:.ttural logs o f the parameters a re used as th e inde pe nd ent 
\ ':.t rt abks to e nsure co mparab le sca le and a logi t a na lys is is 
d\lne f\ 1a rg tna l e ffec ts are inc luded in Tab le 2 beca use log it 
coe ffi c tc nts do no t eas il y le nd the mse lves to i nt crprc t::~ti o n . 
!'he e las tt c tt y o f the pro babi li ty o f the firm c hoos ing to 
tmpro1·e rc liab tl it y wit h respec t to the no n- logged 
pa rame ters is inc lu ded in the l:ts t co lum n to s how the e ffec t 
o f these base l'al ues. (The desc rip ti ve s ta ti s ti cs fo r the 
tndepc tld c nt variab les a re fo un d in the N ume rica l 
!\ ppe nd tx .) 
Tabl e 2 s hows that a ll pa ra me te rs :trc impo rtant in 
d c te rmintn g w h ic h R&D projec ts a re c hosen. N o te 
part 1c ula rly th at th e pa ra me te rs in inequ a lit y (8), the 
mana ge r 's dec is to n rul e, a rc s ig nifi ca nt and ha ve the 
ex pec ted s tg n. I lowcvc r, the most inte res ting result in T abl e 
:2 ts the s tze and s ig n o f the e las ti c it y coe ffic ie nt o n the 
a mbt cnt ex pec ted number of exc ha nges, Ta . The a bso lute 
va lu e of the e last ic it y coe ffi c ie nt is m o re tha n tw ice the nex t 
larges t e las tic ity whic h s ugges ts tha t Ta is the most 
nnpo rtan t d e te rm inan t o f R& D p roj ec t c ho ice. T he s ig n is 
tlega ttv..: wh ic h sugges ts tha t firms arc less like ly to in ves t in 
tmprov tng p rodu c t fa ilure as the a mbi e nt ra te o f produc t 
fa ilu re beco mes larger. A ft e r a ll , spe nding the mo ney to 
reduce the ex pec ted re tum ra te fro m 20% to I 0% decreases 
the numb er o f expected return s by 50%, however spend in g 
the sa m ..: am o unt o f mo ne y to red uce the ex pected re turn ra te 
fro m 50%, to 40% o nl y d ccre:~ ses the numbe r o f e xpected 
rclum s by 20%. T he fo rme r qua lity improve me nt c lea rl y has 
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a bi gger re l :~ ti vc impac t o n firm profit. But if the ambi ent 
qua lit y is prett y bad, it ma kes mo re se nse t locus o n 
redu c in g the cos t o f fa ilure fo r c usto mers. 
As an e xa mpl e, o ft e n w he n new so ftware is introduced 
(sa y Windo ws V ista) the firm and consume rs both expec t 
th ere to be many bu gs in the progra m . lnste<Jd o f focus ing 
R&D resources o n fin d ing a nd fixin g the bugs be fore 
launc h, the firm ca n decrease the cost o f produc t fa ilure by 
improvin g the e ffi c ie nc y o f its custo mer s uppo rt ca ll 
center- wh ich he lps the c us to mer w hose produc t fa ils and 
inc reases pro fi ts fo r the firm . T he implica tio n fo r R&D 
proj ec t ma nagers is c lear; the most impo rtant fac tor to 
cons id er whe n dec idi ng be tween proj ects is the exis ting 
leve l o f produc t re li abi lity. 
T he fin a l goa l o f thi s secti o n is to unde rs ta nd what types 
o f R& D proj ects arc co rre la ted w ith the la rges t ga ins to 
soc ie ty. T o thi s e nd we reg ress the pe rcentage inc rease in 
soc ia l surp lus o n the ex oge no us pa ra mete rs us in g a log-log 
spec ifi ca ti o n to o b ta in e las ti c it y es tima tes. Descripti ve 
s ta ti s t ics are s ho wn in the N um e rica l Appendi x a nd the 
regress io n results are s ho w n in T ab le 3. The impo rt ance 
co lu mn in T ab le 3 is the regress io n coeffi c ie nt multipli ed by 
the s t:tnda rd de vi a t io n o f th e va riabl e beca use the s ta ndard 
devia tiL , o f the natu ra l log m eas ures the average pe rcent age 
c ha nge in the va riabl e . T hi s multipli ed by the e las ti c it y te lls 
how mu c h c hange in the va riabl e is co ming fro m a g iven 
indepe ndent va ri abl e. f o r exa mp le, the impo rt ance o f K
0 
is 
0 .405 indi ca ti ng th a t initi a l c us to me r cos t o f fa ilure is 
ca us ing abo u t -1 I 'X, va riatio n in soc i :~ J surplu s. 
Our resu lts s ugges t that the most im po rt ant para meter is 
ma rket s ize, N. Thi s has intu iti ve a ppea l; :1 large r marke t 
size imp lies the gains fro m innova tio n arc experie nced by 
m o re agents. O the r va riab les tha t deserve me nti o n a rc K 0 , 
me, a nd V w ith s ig n and impo rta nce s imil a r to previous 
s tudi es o f thi s kind (see G re tz, I !ig hfill , and Sco tt (2007)) . 
A nd w hile the s ig n o n V ma y seem co unt er intuiti ve, the 
inc re me nta l be ne fit o n R& D is no t as la rge w he n the produc t 
a lrea dy has a very hi g h va lue . 
C ONCLUSION 
T he primary inno va ti o n o f' th e paper has been to wei g h 
the ad vn nt ages fo r the firm o f two differe nt kinds o f R& D 
proj ec ts. Th e firs t R & D proj ec t impro ves the re li abilit y o f 
the finn' s p roduc t; the seco nd R& D proj ec t c hanges the 
c us to me r 's ex pe ri e nce o f the produc t ra ther tha n the produc t 
itse lf. T he firm' s dec is io n o n w hi c h R& D proj ect to pursue 
depe nds o n pa rame te rs meas uring the e ffec ti veness o f R& D 
spe nd ing o n e ither proj ect, the qua lit y o f the produc t in the 
absence o f any R& D s pe nding , and the custo mer 's 
expe ri e nce, a lso in the absence o f a ny R& D spending . O ur 
res ults s uggest tha t the co nseque nces when the dec is ion 
make r c hooses the wro ng proj ect ca n be subs tanti a l. A nothe r 
s triking result is tha t when the a mbie nt re li ab ility is quite 
bad , the firm does no t improve th e produc t but ins tead 
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reduces the c usto mer' s cost o f' fai lu re. Thi s result is a 
co nseque nce o f the R&D fun c ti o n w hi c h assumes a 
pe rfectible produc t as in the so ft wa re exa mpl e. (G iven 
e nough time the so ft wa re des ig ners coul d fin d a ll the bu gs. ) 
In cases w he re th e prod uc t tS no t perfec tJ b le we ant iCipate 
th e resu lts wo ul d be qui te u1 ffe rent. Futu re resc:-trch m1 gh t 
in ves ti gate the se ns itivit y o f th ese results to the s tru c ture o f' 
R& D spe nding. 
Table 2: Log it Reg•·ess ion Results 
Th e Dep endent Variable Takes th e Valu e I i(il is Profil /lfaximi:ing.for the Fu·m to Clwow 
th e R&D Project 10 lmpro J·e Reliahililr. 0 Oth enl'ise 
Lovit Esti m at io n Maroinal Effects El:lsticit v 
I 
Variab le Beta S td . Beta S td. 
Error En · or 
Co ns tant I 1. 839* 2.235 2.650* (0 496) 
In 'fo -8.983* 0 .268 -2 .0 11 * 0 .063 -5.945 
lnK0 2.975* 0. 11 0 0 .666* 0.024 1.969 
In z7 -4 . 173* 0.202 -0 .934* 0.045 -2 .76 1 
In zK J .824 * 0. 129 0 .85 6* 0 .028 2.53 1 
11111/C I. 130* 0 .07 1 0 .2 53* 0.0 15 0.748 
lnRD£ -0.060* 0.023 -0 0 14 * 0.005 -0 .040 
ln V 2.304* 0. 192 0 .5 16* 0 .044 1.5 25 
In N 0.476* 0. 107 0. 1 07* 0.0 13 0.3 15 
Numbe r o f Observa ti o ns 8740 
Log Like lihood - 1260.258 
* md1 cates s 1 g n1fi c:~ nce a t the I% le ve l. 
1 
Thi s is the e las ti c ity w ith res pect to the base variab le (no t logged) . The fo rmul a reduces to 
f) (I -a ) w he re f) is the coe ffi c ie nt in the logit es t im:ni o n and a is the es tim ated 
pro babi lity o f Improve 'fo calcul a ted at the mea ns. 
Table 3: OLS Regress ion Res ult s 
Dep end en! Variahle : Nat ural Log of Percentage Change in Social Surplus(m111 Underwking 
No RcW to Undertaking 1h e Projir i\faxi111 i: ing R&D Project 
Variable C oefficient Standard Error Importance 
Co nstant l. oO I * 0 .42 1 
In Ta 0.660* 0 .0 19 0.545 
In K0 0.500* 0 .0 14 
0.405 
In z7 -0 .298 * 0.033 -0.092 
In zK -0. 120* 0.0 11 -0. 12 1 
In me 0.450* 0.0 11 0.524 
lnRDE 0. 145* 0.004 0 .4 29 
ln V - 1. 188 * 0.03 1 -0 .495 
In N 0.636* 0.009 0.820 
Improve Re liab ilit y Dumm y -0.006 0.03 1 -0 003 
Numbe r o f Observa ti o ns 8740 
!?' 0.686 
* md1cates s tgmfica nce a t the I% levels. 
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C Ol\ ! I' TAT IO NAL APP EN DIX 
I·m each case. e ither where th e fir m chooses to improve reli ab ility or reduce customer cost, the goa l is to obtai n 
equ 11i bnurn va ri able va lues ::t s we ll as condi ti ons for an interna l so lution. We examine the case where the firm chooses to 
llllpilWC re!Jabd ll y firs t. 
Snh·e th e first o rder cond itiOn lor im prov ing re li ab ilit y from (6) for Q to yield 
N( ( ~(D£) ) Q == - V - ( K0 + me ) To - -- - me . 
2V ~ 
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Substitute Q from (AI) and T fro m ( l) int o (4) and le t K = K
0 
to find equilibrium pri ce: 
Subtracting RDE from (6) and subs tituting Q from (AI) g ives equilibrium pro fit: 
n ~ :V(v - (K, +mel(7;-J~E J-me J - RDE (A2) 
Consumer surplus is 
CS=N ( (v- (P+KT)) dv= (V - (P+KT)/ 
JP+ KT V 2 V (A3) 
where the la tter equalit y uses (4) . Subs tituting (A l) g ives 
CS ~ :V (v - (K, +mc)[T, - J~E J-mc )' 
Finally, socia l surplus is the sum o f pro fit and consumer surplus : 
SS ~ ~~ ( V - ( K0 + mel( T, - J ~E J - me J -RDE 
3 2VPT V 
The second order co nditi on found fro m (6) , ---
7
- = - 2 - < 0 , a lvvays ho lds fo r pos iti ve va lues o f V and N. 
aQ- N 
However, we require pro fit to be non-nega ti ve fo r an int emal so luti on. This occurs when 
v - (K, +mcl(r, -t~E J - mc~ J4V :E 
Notice that when (A4) ho lds it is a lso the case tha i quanti ty is pos iti ve and P > 1/IC. Since consumer surp lus is 
unambi guously pos iti ve, (A4) a lso guarantees pos iti ve soc ia l surplu s. Finall y, we require no n-negati ve ex pected re tums, 
T, ~ JRDE . 
ZT 
(A4) 
Now we exa mine the case where the firm chooses to r luce custo mer cos t. So lve the first o rder co nditi on for reduc ing 
customer cost from (7) fo r Q to yie ld 
N ( [ [RJ5lfJ ) Q = 21/ V - 'fo K0 + me- ~ ---;;;--- - me . (AS) 
Substitute Q from (AS) and K from (2) into (4) and let T = 7~ to find equilib rium pri ce: 
Subtracting RDE fro m (7) and subs tituting Q from (A5) g ives equilibrium pro fit : 
n ~ 4~ (v - 7; [mc+ K0 - r~E J-mc J-RDE (A6) 
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S ubs titut e (A S) into (/\3) to obta in consume r surplus : 
CS ~ s:(v - 7; ( K, + me- J~E J-me J' 
Fina ll y , soc ia l surplus is the s um of profit a nd consumer surplus: 
SS = JN (v- 'fo (K, + me- J RDE J-mcJ
2
- RDE . 
8V ZK 
8 2 VPK V 
As in the case w he re the firm improves re li abilit y, the seco nd o rder cond iti on fro m (7 ), ---- = - 2 - < 0 a lwa ys 
8Q2 N ' 
ho lds fo r pos iti ve va lu es of V and N. /\ ga in , we require pro fi t to be no n-nega ti ve fo r an inte rna l so luti o n: 
v -T,(mc+ K, _ J~E J-me ~ t v ::E (A7) 
When (A 7) ho lds it i a lso the case that q uantit y is pos iti ve a nd P > me. Furthe r, (A 7) g ua ra ntees positi ve soc ia l surplus 
s tnce cons umer surpl us is a lways una mbi guo us ly pos iti ve. F ina ll y, we req u ire no n-nega ti ve c us to mer cost o f failure, 
K, ~ J I~E . 
NUM ERI CAL APP EN UIX 
Thi s sec ti o n presen ts pa rJmc tc r sets used fo r the Mo nte Ca rlo s imu la ti o ns discussed in Secti o n 6 as we ll as some 
pre limin ary results . T here were 8,740 o bscrvJ tio ns thJt y ie lded interna l so luti ons out o f I 00 ,000 poss ibl e a ttempts. The 
descri ptive s ta ti s ti cs fo r parameter se ts tha t y ie lded interna l so luti o ns are p resented in T able A I . T he desc ripti ve s ta ti s tics fo r 
the nat urJ I logs of pJ rame tc r va lues arc di sp la yed in Tab le A2 to co mpl e me nt the log it and regress io n results. 
We co ns truc t ra nges fo r pa r<J mete r se ts used in the s imulatio ns to ha ve no pre-ex is ting bias to wa rds improv ing re liabilit y 
o r red uc ing c usto me r cos t. In o rde r to acco mp li s h this it sho uld be the case th at the ineq ua lity s hown in ( 12) bind o n average, 
o r fo rma ll y 
(me + K0 ) = Fr 
To v-;-; · (AS) 
Gretz, ll ig hfil l, a nd Sco tt (2007) s how thJt _ 7 has to be o rders o f magnitud e larger than the o th e r pa ra me ters to generate 
111te m a l so luti o ns. As such, the average Zr is se t to I 00 ,000. Furthe r, in keep ing in line w ith the mining truc k situa ti o n 
desc ribed in Sec ti o n 3, the in iti a l custo me r cost o f fa ilure is a ll owed to be la rge re la ti ve to the m ax imum va lue o f the produc t. 
A lso, the a mbi ent ex pected numbe r o f exc ha nges is bo und by 0 a nd I , inc lus ive ly. Thi s see ms reaso nable as it is hi g hl y 
unl ike ly tha t marke ts where consume rs expect to re turn the product more tha n o nce would be sus ta ined over time . Fina ll y, 
p lugg in g in the averages o f these three para me ters into (AS) and so lv ing y ie lds z K = 0.025 . 
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Table AI: Oescdptive S tat is t ic of Para m ete •·s t h a t Y ie lded In tern a l Solutio ns inl\lo n tc 
Ca do S imu lations (8740 Observations) 
Parameter Mea n S t. Oev. Mi n im u m l\ I axi m um 
To 0.43 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Ko 496.36 264.30 0.47 999.79 
ZT 100007.68 288 12.84 500 10.07 149984 .6 1 
ZK 0.03 0.0 1 0 .00 0.05 
me 236.98 184 .26 0.07 95 1.96 
RDE ** 960.22 2087.39 0.00 29596.76 
v 696.59 :2 18.59 28 .88 999 .96 
N 439 .68 3 13 . .J I 0.03 999.9 1 
* A ll pa r~une t ers rando ml y se lec ted us tng a untfo rm d ts tnbutt o n over a range w ht c h c lose ly 
fo ll ows the minimum a nd max imum reported . The range fo r K 0 , 111C , V , a nd N is 0 to 
I 000 ; the ra nge fo r 'fa is 0 to I ; the range fo r z K is 0 to 0 .05; the range fo r =r is 50,000 to 
150,000. 
** Co ns tra ined to make overin vestme nt imposs ibl e . 
Tab le ;\2: Descriptive S tatistics for Independ ent Va riables used in S tatis ti ca l Ana lysis (8740 Observations) 
l\1 ea n St. Oev . Minimum l\laximum 
Impro ve Re liabilit y Dumm y ( takes the v~liue I 04 50 0.49 0.000 1.000 
if the pro fit max imi z ing Rc•D proj ect c ho ice is 
to improve re li ab ility, 0 o the rw ise) 
Natural Log o f Pe rcent C hange in Soc ia l -0 079 1. 655 - 11 .:257 7.322 
urp lus fro m unde rtaking no R&D proj ect to 
choosin g the Pro l~t M ax imi z ing R&D projec t 
In 7~ - 1.097 0.826 -5 .53 0.000 
lnK0 
5.98:2 0 .809 -0. 765 6.90 
In zr I 1.468 0.307 10.820 I 1.9 18 
In z" -3.998 1.009 - 11.770 -2.996 
In me 5.023 1.1 63 -2.663 6.859 
lnRD£ 4 .685 2.963 - 16.367 I 0 .:295 
ln V 6477 0.4 16 3.363 6.908 
In N 5.589 1.290 -3 .521 6.908 
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